The UK government is testing out a new stance on leaving the EU, though this should not be confused with a policy reversal. The modification is mostly in tone.
In the past, the Labour leadership described Britain's separation from Europe as a fixed element of the national situation, difficult to manage perhaps, but inescapable. Now, they are willing to acknowledge it as a genuine affliction.
Addressing attendees at a local economic summit recently, the finance minister listed Brexit alongside the pandemic and austerity as factors behind persistent economic lethargy. She repeated this perspective at an IMF meeting in the US capital, observing that the national efficiency issue has been compounded by the way in which the Britain departed from the European Union.
This represented a precisely formulated statement, attributing harm not to the departure decision but to its implementation; faulting the officials who handled it, not the voters who endorsed it. This differentiation is essential when the financial plan is unveiled soon. The aim is to attribute certain economic problems to the agreement reached under previous leadership without seeming to disrespect the aspirations of leave voters.
Among evidence-focused observers, the financial debate is mostly resolved. The Office for Budget Responsibility calculates that the UK's sustained output is 4% lower than it could have been with ongoing European partnership.
Beyond the expenses from new trade barriers, there has been a ongoing drop in business investment caused by governmental uncertainty and regulatory ambiguity. Additionally the lost potential of administrative effort being redirected toward a objective for which no preparation had been made, since supporters had seriously considered the real-world requirements of achieving it.
When facts are undeniable, officials struggle to maintain political neutrality. The central bank chief told last week's IMF meeting that he takes no side on EU exit then stated that its effect on expansion will be negative for the coming years.
He forecast a slight positive adjustment eventually, which offers little comfort to a chancellor who must tackle a significant revenue shortfall soon. Tax increases are planned, and the chancellor wants the citizens to recognize that leaving the EU is a partial cause.
The statement is important to voice because it is accurate. This doesn't ensure political benefit from expressing it. The same reality was evident when the government delivered its earlier fiscal plan and during the national vote, which the party fought while sidestepping the inevitability of tax increases.
At this stage, with the government being neither new nor popular, explaining economic hardship sounds like making excuses to numerous constituents. There might be more benefit in faulting the Tories for everything if they were the sole opposition and a serious challenger. The classic incumbent strategy in a two-party system is to assert responsibility for fixing the previous administration's mess and caution voters. The rise of Reform UK complicates matters.
Ideological gaps between the two parties are minimal, but voters observe interpersonal conflict more than ideological alignment. Those attracted to the Reform leader due to distrust in establishment—especially on border policy—don't see the two parties as similar entities. One party has a history of allowing immigration, while Reform does not—a contrast Farage will repeatedly emphasize.
The Reform leader is less eager to talk about EU exit, in part since it is a achievement jointly owned with Tories and also because there are no positive outcomes to showcase. If challenged, he may argue that the vision was undermined by poor execution, but even that defense admits failure. Simpler to redirect conversation.
This clarifies why the government feels more confident raising the issue. The prime minister's recent party conference speech marked a significant shift. Earlier, he had discussed UK-EU relations in dry, technical terms, focusing on a relationship reset that targeted non-controversial trade barriers like customs checks while avoiding the sensitive topics at the heart of the Brexit aftermath.
In his speech, the PM stopped short of pro-EU arguments, but he suggested awareness of previous assertions. He referenced "false promises on the side of that bus"—referring to leave campaign pledges about health service money—in the framework of "snake oil" promoted by leaders whose simplistic answers exacerbate the country's challenges.
Departure from the EU was compared to Covid as difficult experiences endured by ordinary people in the past period. Likening EU exit to an illness signals a hardening of rhetoric, even if the financial steps being negotiated in EU headquarters remain the same.
The aim is to link the Reform leader to a notorious case of political mis-selling, suggesting he cannot be trusted; that he capitalizes on frustration and creates conflict but cannot manage effectively.
Recent suspensions of local representatives from Reform's local government team supports that message. Recorded videos of a video conference revealed internal squabbling and blame-shifting, highlighting the challenges amateurs face when providing community resources on tight finances—much harder than distributing leaflets about reducing inefficiency or managing borders.
This line of attack is productive for the government, but it depends on the administration's own performance being good enough that choosing the challengers seems a dangerous experiment. Moreover, this is a message for a future campaign that may not occur until 2029. If the leadership wish to appear as antidotes to Faragism, they must demonstrate meanwhile with a clear, constructive program of their own.
There are limits to what is possible with a rhetorical shift, and time is short. How much easier to argue now that Brexit is an affliction and his promoter untrustworthy if they had said so earlier. What additional choices might they have? Should they receive credit for admitting it now when other excuses have failed? Yes. But the problem of reaching the obvious conclusion via the longest path is that observers wonder the procrastination. Starting from the truth is faster.